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Abstract 
The thesis is an exploration of the EU’s actorness through Charlotte Bretherton and John 
Vogler’s assumption that actorness requires a holistic foreign and security policy. The problem; 
To what extent can the European Union, based on its capabilities, operate as a security actor as 
a mean to international actorness? acts as the main narrative focus, answered through two 
propositions giving alternative explanations of the EU’s actorness, the one explaining EU in a 
classical security actor context, and the other focussing on how the EU could achieve actorness 
through its strategic partnership with the UN. The study concludes that since the UN and the EU 
share common objectives, and since they separate their kinds of resources, compliment each 
other. Through its strategic partnership with the UN, the EU can approximate a role as an 
international security actor. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The international affairs in the 21st century pose different threats to world security, and 
challenges for those actors, who tries to manage these threats effectively. These threats include 
traditional and non-traditional meaning of security, extending from high politics of military 
challenges to low politics of natural disasters, that can have consequences for policies in areas of 
human security, such as immigration (Brauch, 2006). Significantly affected by new threats, such 
as the increase of global terrorism, high politics are still of great importance and highly 
prioritised on the international political agenda (Dassú & Menotti, 2010). High politics concerns 
in 21st century involves both state actors and non-state actors, as well as international 
organisations. In 2014 alone there were 9 cases of non-state conflicts (Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program, 2014), implying that classic military concerns have been reshaped. Additionally, 
international institutions have gained importance as an outcome of the increasing globalisation 
wherein governance is furthered on a supranational level (Bertucci & Alberti, 2003). From a 
European perspective, these security threats are perceived plausible to take place outside 
European borders, as the EU project has eliminated inter-state conflicts within the European 
Union (EU) (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Nevertheless, the EU has a stated interest in 
participating as a security actor in  high politics settings on an international stage (Institute for 
European Studies, 2008). International participation is supplemented by cooperation with other 
international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) (Ibid.).  
 
1.1 Problem area  
On behalf of the EU’s citizens, the EU has been seeking to operate collectively and speak with 
one voice since the enactment of the Treaty of Rome in 1958 (Ginsberg, 1999). This was later 
evident in the introduction of European Political Cooperation in 1970, this was interpreted as an 
incentive to increase the EU’s international actorness (Ibid.). A profound challenge to the EU’s 
international profile, is the foreign and security aspect (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). This has 
paved the way for the thesis of investigation to which extent the EU is capable of operating as a 
security actor, since security is perceived as a prerequisite for international actorness. The 
foreign policy of the EU has desired goals, as stated in the Petersberg Tasks of 1992, to 
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formulate foreign policy with a strong philanthropic orientation (MacDonald & de Borms, 2008). 
Indeed, the promotion of conflict management and human rights have increasingly been the 
incentive for the international institutions such as the UN and the EU’s interventionary foreign 
policy. This establishes the EU as an alternative foreign policy actor distancing it from more 
classical foreign policy actors like the US and China (Kohn, 2009). The Petersberg Tasks are still 
in contemporary EU to be executed through policy tools of military, economic and political 
means. More explicitly, a EU army has been discussed with reference to the EU Commission 
President, Jean-Claude Juncker, who stated that it would “help us to form common foreign and 
security policies and allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world” (Euractiv, 2015). This 
would, according to Juncker, make the EU more credible in its security actorness, with the aim 
of combatting threats to international security (Ibid.).  
The thesis seeks to examine the EU’s military capabilities in regard to the complexity of its 
foreign policy. This refers to the EU’s ability to make use of its capacities, moreover these 
capacities are also studied under the auspices of the UN cooperation, as to create another 
platform for actions. An outcome of these suppositions have created problem formulation and 
propositions.  
 
1.2 Problem formulation 
To what extent can the European Union, based on its capabilities, operate as a security actor as 
a mean to international actorness? 
 
The first proposition:  
The EU’s own foreign policy capabilities enable the EU’s security actorness.  
 
The second proposition:  
The EU capabilities in foreign policy enables the EU to be a security actor under the auspices of 
the United Nations.   
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2.0 Methods 
2.1 Analytical focus 
The research design has been structured by an incorporation of both a deductive- and inductive 
reasoning, which has contributed to this qualitative interpretative research. This has been present 
at different stages of the process (Bryman, 2012). The way in which the deductive reasoning is 
reflected in the project, is the approach of a ‘top-down’ logic, which has guided the courses of 
actions in the research (Trochim, 2006). The investigation began in a focus on the international 
role of the EU gained through its supposed partnership with the UN. This gave an incentive to 
investigate under which premises the EU works  through the United Nations in reference to high 
politics matters. Moreover, this is seen in terms of the EU’s capabilities, of reaching security 
actorness. During an early research process, it was found that one of the greatest challenges for 
the EU to act unitarily, is problematised by the EU’s security policy, named the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (Gordon, 1997). The deductive logic therefore lets the thesis work 
from a broader spectrum to a more restricted scope. Thus, the focus has been redefined from 
means of an enhanced observer status to a question of capabilities to act unitarily in terms of 
security, and thereby enable action on the international stage. A further step has enabled the 
research to establish propositions, where they have been studied in accordance to a specific 
context based on empirical data and theories. Thus, these questions have not been articulated as 
theory-driven expectations (Olsen & Pedersen, 2008).  
 
The first proposition is explored by using the framework of Charlotte Bretherton and John 
Vogler’s policy instruments and formulation of policies, with an additional contribution given by 
Christopher Hill’s concept of capabilities1.  
The second proposition seeks to explore the EU’s capabilities within the UN framework, to 
examine whether the EU has capabilities, that can be utilised in a security context. This is carried 
out in regard to Bretherton and Vogler’s criterion of international actorness, in line with the 
Strategic Partnership framework by Thomas Renard2. These two propositions are designed to be 
scrutinised independently, as they do not direct to a single analysis. To support the propositions, 
inductive reasoning has provided the thesis in order to approach Thomas Renard’s 
                                                
1 Figure 1 (page). Illustration of complementary theories.  
2 Figure 3 (page). Illustration of key indicators to international cooperation.  
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conceptualisation of strategic partnerships, which again also has been used differently in terms of 
the selected data (Renard, 2011). Both inductive and deductive implications have also been 
apparent in the conclusion. The top-down logic has contributed to narrow the research to specific 
propositions, yet it has not been the aim to verify or falsify theories. The propositions were 
established to determine the probability of the propositions based on the evidence given in the 
analysis, hence it can be argued to be deductive reasoning. The conclusion has been an 
interpretation of the state of international affairs, and through this an explanatory outcome. 
Nonetheless, the theories have been used as contributory elements of the analysis.  
 
2.2 Propositions 
In order to understand how the propositions have been made probable, the selection of theories 
and concepts, and hereby their explanatory power, have been outlined in the following section. 
Bretherton, Vogler and Hill have been used to examine the extent to how the EU can project its 
capabilities in order to approximate a security role. These two theoretical configurations are used 
as complementary theories (Brady, 2008), as they share an emerging indicator3 that can be 
evaluated in their way of depicting an international role in relation to security.  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of complementary theories.  
Proposition 1 
 
Means to international 
actorness 
Key indicators: Other 
conditions: 
Charlotte 
Bretherton 
and  
John Vogler 
Capabilities 
 
Policy instruments, and 
the formulation of 
policies 
Opportunity 
and Presence 
Christopher 
Hill 
Capabilities Resources, operational 
capacity and ability to 
agree 
Expectations 
 
As illustrated in figure 1, the means to reach international actorness, and the foundation of the 
propositions are subjected to an independent variable, which is capabilities. This is used as a 
structural understanding of the first analysis conducted. The means - capabilities - are key 
                                                
3 Figure 1 (page). Illustration of complementary theories.   
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indicators that Bretherton and Vogler describe as policy instruments, and formulation of policies. 
This has been related to Hill’s conceptualisation of capabilities, which refers to resources, 
operational capacity and the ability to agree. Hill’s resources and operational capacity are 
understood as policy instruments, whereas the ability to agree refers to the formulation of 
policies. Other conditions of opportunity, presence and expectations are elaborated under the 
theory section. The concepts add to a more holistic depiction of the EU’s role as an international 
actor.  
 
Figure 2. Means to the end.  
Capabilities (X) Security Actor (Y) International Actorness (Y) 
Mean                 →    End/Mean   → 
  
End → 
 
For further clarification of what the means of international actorness is, it has been illustrated 
above that X is the independent variable and Y is the outcome. However, in this thesis the first 
end - security actor - also operates as a means to another end Y, which is international actorness.  
For the second section of the analysis, the theory by Renard differs from the first proposition 
with the theories of Bretherton, Vogler and Hill, as he emphasises a different analysis of the 
thesis. His framework has directed to another aspect of the analysis, hereby the context of UN. 
However, as Renard is utilised in accordance to Bretherton and Vogler, the second proposition 
analysis has been functioning as a symbiosis of theories (Brady, 2008). This is evident in 
Renard’s focus of the necessity of the EU to have strategic partnerships. He has been applied to 
highlight that the EU operationalise its capabilities by making use of partnership.  
 
Figure 3. Illustration of key indicators to international cooperation.  
Proposition 2 Means to int. 
cooperation 
Key indicators: Other conditions: 
Thomas Renard Strategic partnership Coherence, meaning 
and approach 
Global relevance 
 
In regard to the second proposition, figure 3 displays the key indicators of international 
cooperation; that Renard’s strategic partnership suggests. These indicators are; coherence, 
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meaning and approach, which are examined in accordance to the three-dimensional model of 
actorness by Bretherton and Vogler. The other condition - global relevance - is according to 
Renard a vital element for the EU to be secured, if the EU desires to be influential.  
 
2.3 Reading guide 
To frame the problem formulation, and the overall design of the thesis, Bretherton and Vogler 
have been used to explain the constructed identity of the EU unpacking the notion of actorness. 
This contributed to develop a basis for understanding to what extent the EU has capacities for 
actions on the international stage on security matters. This has entreated the thesis to exploit 
Hill’s capability-expectations gap in line with the notion of actorness. The EU’s constructed 
internal and external expectations are here used to clarify why the EU – seen from a 
constructivist perspective -  would seek to gain further actorness. Having explored the first 
proposition, the thesis utilised the EU’s strategic partnership programme, which addresses how 
the EU needs to avoid global irrelevance through cooperation. Additionally, it has been implied 
that partnerships are essential, as it allows the EU to be an actor through softer foreign policy in 
another international arena – this is addressed in the second proposition. The problem 
formulation is structured by three core concepts, which are: ‘capabilities’, ‘security actor’, and 
‘international actorness’. It addresses the EU as the main actor and primary focus, which has 
been investigated in relation to its ability to apply its capabilities, a concept that has been 
scrutinised in the theoretical framework by Bretherton and Vogler (2006), and Hill (1993). 
However, what is distinguished as the problem, is the extent to which the EU manages to 
function as a security actor. This is why it has been investigated in relation to the EU’s 
international actorness, to reveal how the EU manages high politic matters in order to stay 
relevant by being present on the international stage. 
  
2.4 Conceptual framework 
Within the conceptual framework, the concepts supported by the theoretical framework has been 
given. The two concepts of actorness are seen as the ends of a successful foreign policy. The 
concept of capabilities has been included because of the overlap of theories on this concept 
necessitating a clarification of this concepts relationship with the thesis, and further the concept 
of EU Battlegroups has been given as an example of EU actorness for further use in the analysis. 
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2.4.1 International actorness 
The thesis has defined ‘international actorness’ with reference to Bretherton and Vogler’s 
concepts of opportunity, presence and capability, which all contributes to the analysis and will be 
applied in the theoretical framework (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Moreover, Hill’s 
conceptualisation of ‘international actorness’ is used as a complementary element, as it has been 
clarified that foreign policy is perceived as a component for the construction of the EU’s 
international actorness; “[…] (1) delimited from others, and from its environment; which is (2) 
autonomous, in the sense of making its own laws and decisions […] (3) possesses certain 
structural prerequisites for action on the international level, such as legal personality, a set of 
diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties.” (Sjöstedt in 
Hill, 1993:309).  
 
2.4.2 Security actor 
The concept of ‘security actor’ is defined by scrutinising the EU’s CFSP with focus on its ability 
to intervene militarily within Common Security and Defence Policy (EEAS, 2015a). In the 
thesis, the external activities of the EU constitutes their security role (Bretherton & Vogler, 
2006). Furthermore, the EU’s security actor role is a prerequisite for increasing the scope of the 
EU’s international actorness. Nevertheless, the security actorness is conceptualised in regard to 
high politics that involves hard power, such as military capabilities. It is noteworthy to state that 
the EU’s security role does not necessarily constitute the whole international actorness of the 
EU. This means, that the EU might act as a greater international actor within another policy field 
than security.  
 
2.4.3 Capabilities 
‘Capabilities’ are the ability to engage in political activity, by furthering the interests of an actor.  
Bretherton and Vogler defines capabilities as having available policy instruments, and the ability 
to project these, and furthermore the ability to formulate policies (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). 
Hill’s prerequisite for capabilities include concepts such as resources, operational capacity and 
cohesiveness (Hill, 1997). The theoretical implications of these two concepts of capabilities are 
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described in the theoretical framework, and have aimed to contribute to the analysis of the two 
propositions on the Union’s capabilities.  
 
2.4.4 The EU Battlegroups 
To understand the EU’s availability of capabilities in terms of policy instruments, the concept of 
‘Battlegroups’ has been used as an example of this in the analysis. A Battlegroup is a military 
instrument used in high politics concerns of rapid responses that is deployable from a unanimous 
Council decision (EEAS, 2013a:1). They illustrate the EU’s military capabilities as a mean to 
intervene in crisis management settings (Barcikowska, 2013). At any, a full 18 EU Battlegroups 
are available for deployment by the Council, two of these in a permanent state of readiness 
(EEAS, 2013a:2). In regard to the thesis, the Battlegroups marks an example of the EU’s 
operational capacity and resources (Hill, 1993) that are available to the EU.  
 
2.5 Theoretical approach  
The EU foreign policy cannot be understood from a classic perspective of state actor 
sovereignty, as it has been recognised that the EU, through its comprehensive approach holds a 
sui generis nature. The unique socially constructed EU foreign policy identity, have necessitated 
more than a single theory to uncover the complexity of internal and external constraints. The 
theories therefore deviate from a parsimonious structure, as instead they are positioned on 
different explanatory stages where each contributes to an interpretation of the investigation. 
Moreover, constructivism makes it more viable to establish a dynamic perspective of the EU’s 
security actorness in different contexts, and to establish how the EU can utilise its capabilities to 
gain this security role. Also, it highlights how the actuality of the EU foreign policy is 
understood through the acknowledgements and practices of CFSP and CSDP (Fuglsang & Olsen, 
2004).  
 
2.6 Empirical data 
This section outlines the use of literature and data that has been used for the findings, in the 
qualitative examination of the propositions. The data is utilised qualitatively with the application 
of empirical material being acquired predominantly from literature consisting of official 
14 
documents from the EU and the UN.  A distinction has been made between data and literature, in 
which data consists of first hand sources used as empiria (data), and the literature covers ideas 
and other academic contributions. The data covers statements of financial support and official 
documents, the European Security Strategy [ESS] (2003), declarations and treaties; the Treaty of 
the European Union (TEU, 2012). The literature includes e.g. Hill’s contribution to the 
international role of the EU, or Thomas Renards study of the EU Strategic Partnership Program. 
 
2.7 Limitations  
The main critique of Thomas Renard’s; “The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True EU 
Strategic Partnerships” is found in his choice of empiria. The focus on the EU’s strategic 
partnerships with nation-states leaves out parts of the EU strategic partnership programme that is 
non-state based. This is exemplified by the European Strategic Partnership Observatory website, 
in which a database on the 10 nation-state partners can be found, hereby excluding information 
on strategic partnership with international organisations (European Strategic Partnership 
Observatory, 2013). Hence, leaving a gap in his analysis and critical arguments of the strategic 
partnerships.  
A general critique of the deductive reasoning method is to be aware of assumptions as these 
govern the conclusion. In the following a list of assumptions are given. 
The first assumption is that the EU wants to be an international security actor. Even though the 
project will seek to explain Hills expectations in a normative frame, the social construct that is 
the EU, in this project desires to be an international security actor. The opposite could in social 
constructivist and identity theory be the case, as the EU could equally seek to be limit or 
decrease the EU foreign policy scope. 
Second assumption of the thesis is that foreign policy equals security policy. Even though these 
two concepts could be limited from each other, the thesis has sought to explain the relationship 
between these two in EU affairs, instead of how foreign policy could be seen in economic 
actorness which leads to the next assumption; the ideal EU foreign policy as described by the 
theories equals actorness.  
This is important in how the thesis views actorness as an outcome of foreign policy, as actorness 
could be determined by other explanatory elements, but the thesis and the theories has specified  
the requirement of foreign policy being a determining variant for actorness. 
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As a final remark on the assumptions, the concepts given by Hill and Renard could have an 
explanatory power. It is noteworthy to mention that as these two are only concepts and not full 
theories, they could potentially lack a predictive mechanism. 
 
3.0 Theory 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is constructed by theorists studying the EU. The theorists  
have been found to contribute to the examination of the EU’s capabilities in relation to its 
international actorness. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler will be utilised as the theoretical 
foundation where the analysis will take point of departure in their three-dimensional model of 
‘actorness’. The problem will further be highlighted by Christopher Hill’s notion of the 
‘Capability-Expectations Gap’, which examines one of the three constitutive elements, namely 
‘capabilities’ in accordance to expectations. Lastly, Thomas Renard and his study of Strategic 
Partnerships will help to outline the EU’s comprehensive approach to complex security concerns, 
which are managed under the auspices of the UN.  
 
3.1 The three dimensional model of actorness  
The perception of an international actor will be supported by the framework of Charlotte 
Bretherton and John Vogler, which presents a three dimensional model of actorness. This 
framework fosters a comprehension of how the EU can be perceived as an international actor, on 
the basis of its activity in an international relation. The EU is however considered to be under 
construction, as it undergoes processes of complexity and interactions in line with internal and 
external circumstances. The model of ‘actorness’ is based on three elements of; opportunity, 
presence and capability (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:24). It is worth mentioning throughout this 
section, these three dimensions are explained separately, whereafter an explanation is given 
when they are intertwined.  
 
3.1.1 Opportunity  
The first element is opportunity, which encompasses external activity wherein it refers to the 
changing context of factors from the external environment, which again can create incentives for 
rethinking the ways in which the EU is formulating policies and acting. Indeed, it points to 
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factors in which opportunities, as an outcome of world affairs, multiply. Further it encourages 
the EU to act according to these opportunities by taking a stand and making itself more visible 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:24). However, this element does not notionally seek to explain that 
world events explicitly paves the way for the EU to embrace opportunity. Nevertheless, these 
events invites actors to create opportunities for themselves on the international stage. The context 
of the world events and their aftermath can provide “[...] opportunities for the EU to adopt new 
roles and responsibilities” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:27). The conditions deriving from the 
external environment are therefore contributing to the framing of the actions and inactions of the 
EU, in contrast to occurring opportunities, therefore it can also be seen as constraints on 
actorness (Ibid).  
 
3.1.2 Presence 
In order to encompass opportunity, it is necessary to evaluate the second element, which is the 
EU’s presence on the international stage. Presence implies the EU’s ability to exert influence 
beyond its borders, hereby being able to impact events. This ability can also be used in 
collaboration with other actors. The exercising of influence is therefore greatly determined by an 
actor’s presence, which makes this element of great importance to actorness. This is expressed 
when referring to the EU’s shared understandings, hereby the identity of the EU,  “[...] that gives 
meaning(s) to what the EU is and what it does” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006:27). Nevertheless, 
according to the author’s model, presence is explicitly evident within the EU’s foreign policy, 
which creates relevance for the thesis, as it is a focal element of investigation. This is of great 
importance as it enables one to evaluate their influence through their external activities, as a way 
of scrutinising the EU’s conduct in relation to security. The external activities are essential in 
regard to the EU’s goals of a security role, which aims to create stability in countries outside the 
EU’s borders (Keohane & Lehne, 2014). In other words, the security dimension is a main aspect 
of the EU’s presence. The application of Bretherton and Vogler is beneficial to the thesis as 
foreign policy is perceived as a component to what constructs international actorness. This is 
furthered by the increasingly interconnected world where actors to a greater extent rely on one 
another in terms of economic, political and military aspects that progressively gives more 
importance to foreign policy (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). To give an outline of the two 
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elements already explained, the EU’s presence determines the EU’s proceedings externally, 
whereas opportunity pursue to what extent the EU is able to operate in a given situation (Ibid).  
 
3.1.3 Capabilities  
Through events within a changing context, opportunities occur, which enable actors to compete 
for visibility, hereby gaining presence. However, this evidently depends on the actor’s 
capabilities, which is the last element of the model that generates the response to opportunity and 
enables the EU’s capability to project presence. Capabilities relate to the EU’s internal context as 
well as its external actions. This refers to the availability of policy instruments to ‘activate’ the 
functionality of the former elements, it also substantiates the EU’s ability to act in response to 
opportunity (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 24). The very fact that the EU can be provided with 
possibilities for external actions is relying on its “[...] ability to formulate effective policies and 
the availability of appropriate policy instruments.” (Ibid: 29). Currently, the EU has through its 
CSDP access to a myriad of instruments. These entails; political means of diplomacy and legal 
frameworks, economic instruments in terms of sanctions, trade and development aid; lastly 
military means are also at disposal for the EU. However, the last is only possible with approval 
from the European Council (EEAS, 2015c).  
 
Regardless of the instruments, which by all means are a necessity, what becomes crucial is the 
EU’s ability to come to an agreement internally and thereafter effectively make use of its 
instruments externally. Indeed, what is central as a component for the construction of 
international actorness is capabilities and the capacity to use these. Otherwise, the model 
becomes insufficient in explaining the EU’s international profile in regard to security (Ibid: 29). 
The theory therefore provides an insight to whether the EU, as an agency, can carry out actions, 
based on their capacity to formulate policies effectively, and consistently stick to these. This will 
be understood through the EU’s CFSP, which is an institutionalised process of consultation and 
cooperation between EU Members States, wherein common decisions are the main opening to 
foreign policy issues. Assuming that effective policies have been formulated within the 
complexity of CFSP, it will lead to the applicability of policy instruments found under the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (European Parliament, 2015). 
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In other words, to what extent can it be illustrated that the EU has the capabilities to exploit its 
policy instruments and hereby realising opportunities by performing presence as well? If an 
inadequacy emerges, it is found convenient to scrutinise the EU’s security role in another 
context, such as the UN, in order to reach a more thorough analysis. This will to some extent 
conflict with the account based on Bretherton and Vogler’s advocacy of ensuring coherency and 
consistency. Thus, this will be an analytical assumption that the EU can, without this full 
coherence and consistency, be a limited international actor in regard to hard security matters. 
Coherency thus refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies and processes 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 30). Whereas consistency indicates the degree of correspondence 
between the external policies of the Member States and those of the EU, henceforth a measure of 
the Member States political commitment to common policies (Ibid.). If problems of coherency or 
consistency occur, the EU would be incapable of utilising its capabilities as their capacity would 
be hindered. It will be addressed that through the treaties the EU has been provided with the 
means of accessing a greater international profile.  
 
3.2 The Capability-Expectations Gap 
Christopher Hill from London School of Economics has in his article from 1993 The Capability-
Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role, examined the prospect of the 
European Foreign Policy. He presents the concept of ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’, which 
explains the interplay between the expectations and capabilities, and how an unbalance, in what 
the EU is able to perform and what the EU is expected to perform, have emerged.   
 
His examination begins with his framing of an international actor, as this paves the way for 
which the emergence of the gap takes place. Initially he presents a sui generis argument that 
characterises the EC - now known as the EU - as an actor that does not necessarily need to attain 
‘state-like qualities’ in order to exert influence externally. Hence, it is possible for the EU as a 
non-state actor to operate internationally in fields of security and defence, despite these policy 
areas are traditionally associated with nation-states (EEAS, 2015c). These are prerequisites that 
are necessary in order to make the international role achievable, or at least, accessible, which is 
highlighted through the gap. Though, before unfolding the gap and the certain preconditions of 
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the desired actor role, the framing of an international actor is carried out through Gunnar 
Sjöstedt’s definition, which is defined as:   
 
“[…] (1) delimited from others, and from its environment; which is (2) autonomous, in the sense 
of making its own laws and decisions […] (3) possesses certain structural prerequisites for 
action on the international level, such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the 
capability to conduct negotiations with third parties.” (Hill, 1993: 309). 
 
An actor on the international stage is therefore expected first to have these capabilities and 
thereafter to carry them out, which can be said to be an expectation in itself.  
 
3.2.1 External expectations 
Hill presents his own criteria of how the Community is expected to perform, which are 
characteristics of the EU as a regional pacifier, global intervenor and mediator of conflicts (Hill, 
1997:313). A greater clarification of expectations are given from his second study of this notion 
in 1997, which explains what the EU is able to do within the contextual background position of 
the EU, in line with the general security expectations of that time. The expectations are defined 
as: 
 
“ [...] those other ambitions or demands of the EU’s international behaviour which derive from 
both inside and outside the Union. They can be many and various: political pressures to grant 
membership of the EU to supplicant states, or to provide 'solutions' to the problems of third 
countries; pressure for economic assistance, in the form of aid, trade preferences or even access 
to the single market; intellectual expectations that the EU can solve the problem of the nation-
state, provide a new framework for European order or an alternative identity for the non-
American west.” (Hill 1997:8). 
 
Although, it is cited that demands can emerge both internally and externally, the tasks the EU is 
perceived to engage in, is indeed in affairs taking place beyond its own borders. This stresses on 
the scope of foreign policy as a focus, which is centrally evident for Hill’s conceptualisation of 
an international actor. Thus, expectations are defined within this specific policy area, and not 
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merely the EU’s international role as such, in the sense that the internal policies contributes to its 
external profile. According to Hill, a European Foreign Policy requires “[...] an executive 
capable of taking clear decisions on high policy matters, and of commanding the resources and 
instruments to back them up” (Hill, 1993: 316). This criteria encapsulates how expectations do 
not operate isolated or by itself. It is a dependent variable connected to capabilities, in which 
they depend on each other. This can be illustrated in terms of how the EU is expected to perform, 
as the EU is expected to accommodate external demands. Hence, expectations can contribute to 
the shaping of the EU’s capabilities, as such it creates a pressure from external factors.  
 
3.2.2 Defence building to effective foreign policy making  
With the aim of understanding how the EU can be enabled to perform in accordance to the 
desired expectations, there are some capabilities, which are vital to meet this request. Hill gives 
an account of ‘capabilities’, which are:  “[...] the conventional instruments of foreign policy - the 
use and threat of force, diplomacy, economic carrots and sticks, cultural influence – […] 
political stability, together with cohesiveness, or the capacity to reach a collective decision and 
to stick to it.” (Hill, 1997:9). This highlights the essential elements, such as resources, 
instruments and cohesiveness, which facilitate expectation and comprehensive actorness of the 
EU. Not only would capabilities contribute to exterior situations, however, it also contributes to 
the identification of the EU. Hill advocates that capabilities, within foreign policy area, is to 
proximate a “distinctive, high-profile and coherent identity” (Hill, 1993:307). This sheds light 
on the importance of a unified effective European Foreign policy.  
 
3.2.3 High demands adequate to the ability of actorness?  
With regard to the two variables of the gap, a clarification of the reasoning of its emergence is 
important. Although this is in a specific policy area, it has an impact of the collective role of the 
EU, which the clarification outlines. The capability-expectations gap emerged on a twofold 
reason. The first reason comes into play when a full actorness and an existing coherent system is 
far from realisation, which Hill argued was evidently found in the EC to an extent. The second 
reason refers to entail a certain commitment as a the Community should - in unity - have the 
“[...] ability to take decisions and hold to them” (Hill, 1993: 318). Can the expectations to the 
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EC, therefore be challenging in terms of the Community’s capabilities? In this respect, it is very 
evidently indicated, that the ability to agree is central for the accommodation of resources and 
the instruments an actor can apply. Thus, if this is met inadequately, the interplay between 
expectations and capabilities will, as an outcome, be unbalanced. When Hill was examining the 
European Foreign Policy at first, in accordance to expectations and capabilities, he stated 
that:“The Community does not have the resources or the political structure to be able to respond 
to the demands which the Commissions and certain Member States have virtually invited [...] 
over the pace of internal change” (Hill, 1993:315). This underlines the different elements of the 
two dependent variables, which have an impact on the gap’s scope. In other words, the 
correlation between ends and means can become ambiguous in regard to foreign policy. It is 
therefore reasonable, and noteworthy, to state that such a gap include consequences. One of the 
predictions that Hill foresees to occur is the danger of unrealistic policies, in regard to the 
incapability of the EU to respond to the expectation (Ibid.).  
 
3.2.4 Decreasing internal obstacles, increasing external appearance  
In line with foreseeing a danger of the gap, Hill also provides ways in which the gap with 
intelligence can potentially be closed over a period of time. One preferable way of doing so is to 
establish “[...] a single, effective foreign policy [...] (Hill, 1993: 315). This would be 
fundamental in the disassembly of the gap, when it creates a common ground of having a 
framework, which could leave out further elaboration of the approaches to high politics. Also, 
most importantly is the effectiveness, which is crucial for a security actor role as to manage 
conflicts, or contribute to peacekeeping operations. However, this required major changes from 
the European Community, in sense of being able to take clear decisions on high politics matters, 
and then impose the necessary resources and instruments to back those decisions up (Ibid:316).  
Yet, with time and intelligence, the gap can be minimised by another approach, which is if the 
EU increases its capabilities or decreasing expectations. In order to carry out the former, it would 
depend greatly upon political and constitutional changes. Thus, these changes must ensure to 
provide cohesiveness, resources and operational capability (Ibid:321). However, the latter - 
decreasing expectations - would lower the ambitions for the EC in providing a foreign policy, 
which would on the international stage reflect the limits of the Community’s actorness.  
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3.2.5 Strength and scope   
As the notion has been conceptualised in relation to foreign policy, Hill highlights a specific 
dimension that has created the unbalance between expectations and capabilities, which is the 
defense dimension. In this statement, he finds support by using Hedley Bull – IR, English School 
Scholar – as a critique to the then EU’s international profile. The critique derives from its lack of 
a defense in which it is emphasised as “[…] defense is the key to the development of the 
Community’s place in the world” (Hill, 1993:318). Therefore, in order for the EU to become an 
international actor, it needs to develop its defence capabilities. This stresses upon the importance 
of incorporating a hard security scope of military power to build capacity to defend oneself, and 
hereby exert influence beyond its borders. However, the thesis will seek to address if the EU has 
developed sufficient capabilities in order to approximate its role as a security actor. Though, 
other capabilities in relation to security affairs – if found necessary to the explanation of the EU 
– to evaluate whether a military defence is essential to perform as a security actor, will also be 
taken into account.  
 
Bull anticipates that a military dimension would lead to a serious step forward in transforming 
itself into an international actor, as when stating that the EU will reach a position wherein it is 
able to act purposefully and as one (Bull, 1983 in Hill, 1993:338). This is embedded in the idea 
that if the Community does not project military power it will be restricted in terms of its ability 
to act: “[…] if the Community does not develop the capacity to defend itself […] it will remain a 
great many things which it will not be able to do (Hill, 1993: 318). The military aspect of the EU 
will be highlighted in relation to whether it strengthens its actorness. 
 
This policy area is very concerned with the collectiveness of EU, which is crucial to their role. 
This is evident when Hill states concerns about the EU foreign policy, firstly; the degree to 
which policy is conducted on a collective basis, and secondly; the various issue areas into which 
policy develops in practice. These potential problems are found within the decision-making 
strength of the Community (Hill, 1993:322). However, to draw attention to the defence 
dimension and deviate from the complexity of decision-making procedures, Hill foresees three 
other prospective challenges; mutual obligation, operational capacity and resources. Mutual 
obligation is found essential, as it attributes to a ‘shared responsibility’, which again refers to the 
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difficulty of having a supreme and final decision-maker, who can combine the EU into a unified 
whole, however instead they constitute a ‘pluralistic security-community’ (Hill, 1993). The 
research will attempt to explore the challenges that the EU may encounter in terms of its ability 
to act as a unified actor. This became crucial for the thesis to incorporate, as the research derived 
from their unitary role, and which will be presented to be of great importance within a policy 
field such as foreign policy.  
 
As a conclusive remark by Hill, the role of the EU needs to reach a more realistic perception of 
what the EU is capable of performing. This perception does not necessarily mean to have lower 
expectations. To make expectations adequate it must be assessed in terms of capabilities, which 
is a way of sustaining ambitions for the EC to support a foreign policy. If not, capabilities will be 
‘talked up’ resulting in exactly what Hill conceptualises as a capability-expectations gap (Hill, 
1993).  
 
3.3 Strategic partnership - A source of opportunity? 
This last theory will be utilised with means of highlighting how Strategic Partnerships can be 
advantageous when dealing with security matters, as it invites incentives for cooperation, which 
EU can benefit from internationally. Also, the Strategic Partnerships contributes relevance to the 
actors position.  
 
Thomas Renard, who is a Senior Research fellow for the Egmont Royal Institute for 
International Relations, mainly focuses on the development of strategies by the EU, to be 
managed in line with their strategic partnerships, in which they are mainly perceived to be 
emerging powers (Egmont Institute, 2013). This is expressed in the article The Treachery of 
Strategies (2011), which also criticised the conduct of the European Union Strategic Partnership 
program. This critique is based on the argumentation of its lack of; coherence, meaning and 
approach. The lack of strategy can impact the EU negatively in sense of decreasing the relevance 
of their international role (Renard, 2011:5). However, according to Renard, if the EU and its 
Member States would adopt or encounter the essential facts of the global power structure, it 
could counteract the global irrelevance, which the EU is currently meeting (Ibid). In order to 
stay relevant, the EU is obligated, for its own sake, to rethink the ways in which it approaches 
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foreign policy. This was first discussed as a concept in September 2010 by the European Council 
(Renard, 2011). The need to reevaluate the EU’s foreign policy refers to the fact that emerging 
powers have created a global power shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific, implying a multipolar 
complexity that can lead to cooperation or competition. There will be a confrontation if the EU is 
unsuccessful in taking a stand and make its strategic direction more approachable for both 
partners, wherein clarifications of the partners role are made, whether it being competition based 
or cooperation based (Ibid.). 
  
When strategic partnership is advocated by Renard, he stresses the importance of common 
strategic objectives, who are vital in order to foster an understanding of the EU’s aspirations 
(2011). However, the aim of the EU is lacking, as its strategic objectives appears to be unclear 
and hereby lacks direction. The reasoning of the strategic partnerships declines and a lack of a 
grand strategy therefore occurs as well. According to Renard, the partnerships should be a way in 
which the EU can pursue its interests within these multilateral forums. However, when the 
strategic reasoning is undefined it leaves little knowledge of how to advance these partnerships 
and it therefore leads to insufficient multilateralism. Indicating that the existing partnerships are 
to an extent lacking the strategic aspect of the partnership.    
  
An attempt to strengthen multilateralism, was the European Security and Strategy [ESS] which 
was adopted by the European Council in December 2003 (European External Action Service, 
2015). The ESS provided a conceptual framework for the CFSP, and referred to the EU’s 
strategic approach as strategic partners were stated crucially concerning security. However, the 
ESS was unsuccessful in terms of the questions highlighted by Renard, as “[...] it says more 
about how to do things than about what exactly to do” (Renard, 2011:IV). This is influenced by 
the limited dialogue in regard to be able to effectively address interests at a level of politico-
strategy (European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, 2015a). This leaves the strategic 
partnerships to be less effective, than what they actually were meant to be. Elaborating further, it 
has been expressed that the lack of amplification has lead to a discouraging spillover effect, 
which has created absence of actions. Hereby making the strategic partnerships an instrument 
empty of both meaning and substance (Renard, 2011:IV).  
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Nevertheless, strategic partnerships are still of great importance to the EU, considering it as a 
necessity to manage the changeable global order effectively, and thus persist in their relevance 
on the international scale. Nethertheless, the partnerships should not only be strategic in name, 
which they are currently (Ibid.). The strategic course of partnerships are one component of many 
to the construction of the EU as an international actor, since it determines the EU to act 
coherently in accordance with its Member States. Moreover, it “pulls the EU’s weight on the 
international stage” (Renard, 2011:15). Thus, it generates an ability to pursue relevance. It 
therefore becomes vital for the EU to explicitly identify and articulate the visions and objectives 
that it wishes to bring forth in order to establish a grand strategy for the EU, wherein direction 
will become more clarified (Renard, 2011). Renard argues that a grand strategy will contribute to 
distinguish between the partnerships, and outline - with importance - the true strategic 
partnerships. It is vital to underline that the strategic partnerships studied by Renard have been 
nation-states. However, as this does not explicitly exclude others, it is therefore possible to 
establish partnerships with non-state actors such as international institutions. Based on this, it is 
the intention of the thesis to question if the strategic partnership with specifically the United 
Nations, is a way for the EU to pursue it own interests, which otherwise might have been 
complicated through its own approach of foreign policy. The focus of the research will therefore 
take point of reference in EU’s operational capacity under the auspices of the UN. This was 
particularly chosen due to its scope as an international forum, which gives further incentive to 
address if this partnership provides the EU with a platform wherein it  can perform differently.  
 
3.4 Is the EU relevant for the international arena?   
Renard’s focus on strategic partnerships takes a turning point, wherein it is questioned whether 
the EU itself is recognised as a strategic partner from the perspective of its counterparts. This 
will result in an increase of relevance of the EU as a strategic partner. Renard states that one of 
the most visible limits of the EU’s strategic actorness is the lack of coordination between the EU 
and its Member States. This is understood as a divergence in, amongst other factors, the 
decision-process of who can become a strategic partner and how they can be beneficial through 
cooperation. This divergence is based on Member States, especially big ones, which weigh their 
national preference higher in foreign policy. However, Renard is hopeful in this being decreased 
with a truly common CFSP, which will narrow the deviation of interests and make the EU be 
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considered as a strategic partner with interests and values coherently articulated (Renard, 2011). 
As to when the thesis evaluate the cooperation with UN, it will be addressed whether the two 
actors will recognise each other. 
3.5 Critique of framework 
The main critique of the framework Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler as described by 
Sebastian Wolf is found in the authors inadequate use of the three concepts of actorness, 
‘capabilities’, ‘presence’ and ‘opportunity’, making the descriptive chapters on EU policies lack 
a certain analytical depth. Wolf further criticises Bretherton and Vogler for basing a great deal of 
their causal power in social constructivism, leaving very little explanatory space for other grand 
theories such as International Relations theories (Wolf, 2008). Despite, Bretherton and Vogler 
admit that Member State’s preferences can prevent EU unity, preferences do not necessary need 
to be socially constructed. Thus, meaning that social constructivism is not the only explanation 
of preferences.  
However, their theoretical framework lacks a critical explanation for other reasons of why EU 
lacks foreign policy actorness. To create a thorough examination of the EU’s foreign policy, it 
would have been appropriate to incorporate other perspective of why the EU might lack 
actorness.  
 
4.0 Analysis 1 
This analytical section builds on the first assumption of the thesis, that the capabilities of the 
European Union are limited within its foreign and security policy to act as an international actor.  
Following Bretherton and Vogler, the aspect of capabilities is used as the predominant analytical 
tool to evaluate to what extent the EU has an international actor role. This is considered to be 
crucial for the characteristic of the EU’s unity, as it applies to the EU’s capacity to produce 
collective decisions, rather than to the EU’s impact on events, because the former is a 
prerequisite for the latter (Wolfgang, 2011). This is how capabilities are perceived to be 
predominant, as they initiate presence to have an impact on events. However, capabilities have 
been interpreted as being two-dimensional. This is evident from the model that firstly states; the 
availability of policy instruments, and secondly; the ability to formulate effective policies and act 
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upon them (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). The former will be analysed by including Hill’s 
criterion of capabilities in terms of military ambitions, whereas the latter is analysed from the 
framework of Bretherton and Vogler. 
 
4.1 Capacity of agency:  
4.1.1 Military capabilities as a necessity for international activity  
In order to analyse if the policy instruments, by Bretherton and Vogler, have sufficiently 
developed to allow the EU strategic and treaty resources of a military foreign policy, Hill’s 
understanding of capabilities will be applied. In the theoretical framework, it was conveyed that 
Hill accounts capabilities as “[...] the conventional instruments of foreign policy — the use and 
threat of force[…]” (Hill, 1997:9). This theoretical stand is utilised to determine if the EU has 
significantly extended its capabilities from the impaired form it was presented in Hill’s article of 
1993. For this understanding of the current military capabilities of the EU, the EU’s concept of 
‘Battlegroups’ from 2004 are scrutinised as a measurement of the EU’s policy instruments. The 
Battlegroups became a foreign policy instrument forming a new rapid reaction force of the 
headline goals of 2010 (EEAS, 2013a:1). Further investigation is conducted on capabilities of 
Member States used during interventions. 
 
In 1993 Hill criticised the EU for not having met expectations of the international community by 
solving the Yugoslav civil war. He argues that the EU did not have the capabilities to meet 
international expectations during the Yugoslav civil war. Hill further describes three challenges 
to the EU’s capabilities (Hill, 1993), which are the main problem the EU faces as an international 
actor, and without fulfilling all three elements, to at least some degree, the EU will not be able to 
operate as an effective international actor. These challenges in regard to capabilities are; 
resources, operational capacities, and mutual obligation. The thesis seeks to explore if these three 
aspects of capabilities has been sufficiently developed to allow the EU military capabilities. 
 
4.1.2 Resources  
The first challenge the EU faced in the 1990s was resources, which currently are viewed in terms 
of economic proficiency as one of the strongest available strengths of the EU. In the budget of 
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the EU the funds that are devoted to the EU is established under heading IV (European Union, 
2014:105). Under the section of headline IV, the resources and thereby the external funding 
instruments are covered, this include humanitarian aid and the CFSP, which involve the CSDP 
missions. It is found that the overall CDSP budget - excluding direct Member State contributions 
- has steadily increased from 2004 to 2011, extending from approximately € 35 million to € 326 
million — were € 274.525 million of the 2011 expenditure was distributed for civilian CSDP 
missions (EPLO, 2012:13). This demonstrates that the military capacity of the EU has increased 
massively since 2004. In addition, an UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda is taken into 
account, since it can be evaluated if the EU has the economic resources to manage military 
conflicts. The Rwanda operation (UNAMIR) budget is compared with the CDSP budget due to 
the UN and the EU being of a similar structure in terms institutional arms and policies bodies. 
The operation in Rwanda took three years, from 1993-1996, and was on a mandate expanded to a 
military intervention (UN Peacekeeping, 1997). The operations had at its completion 
expenditures for approximately € 412 million (UN Peacekeeping, 1997) - € 137.33 million a 
year. As mentioned before, the CSDP has a yearly budget of € 274.525 million. In this context it 
is thus analysed that the EU would be capable of projecting its resources onto a military conflict, 
since the expenditures of the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda are more than covered of the 
budget of the EU.   
However, it does require a certain acknowledgement that the EU’s budget is apart from 
contributions from Member States — the actual economic resources are deemed to be higher 
than what is illustrated above. The CFSP is further used for a wide variety of foreign policy 
operations, and CSDP is again only one of these. Nevertheless, if the contributions of the 27 
Member States were included — without the Danish opt-out (Cini & Borragán, 2013) - it would 
have given a skewed picture of the EU’s military capacity. Since this would depend on the 
Member States providing their full military capacity to the EU, but this is assumed to be 
unrealistic as it would require the EU Member States to put their full military capacity under an 
EU cause. It is therefore argued that the EU is able to fight a war with the economic resources at 
the disposal of the CFSP. And it can thus be conceived that the EU does have the economic 
resources to pursue a military foreign policy.  
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4.1.3 Operational capacity 
The EU is challenged on operational capacities (Hill, 1993). There has been given great 
importance in developing these capacities, which is evident in the discussions of every major 
summit until 2004, where the EU — led by France, Germany and the UK — finalised the 
concept of the ‘EU Battlegroups’ (Barcikowska, 2013). A EU Battlegroup is a relatively small 
armed force of 1,500 soldiers with additional support staff and material obtained from the 
Member States. A Battlegroup is able to deploy within a timeframe of maximum ten days from a 
unanimous Council decision, deployable for 30 days without supplies (self sustaining) and a 
further 120 days with resupplies. A full 18 EU Battlegroups should be available for deployment 
by the EEAS with the permission of the Council, two of these in a permanent state of readiness 
(EEAS, 2013a:2). However, the defence capabilities included in these actions belong to the EU 
Member States (European Commision, 2014). It is acknowledged and established that the EU by 
itself does not have a military army. The intended utility of these Battlegroups is evident in the 
change of the Petersberg tasks, which are declared in the foreign policy goals of the CFSP. The 
previous Petersberg tasks of 1992 reflected the ambitions of the EU to respond to the opportunity 
of a changing international context, as well as establishing itself as an international actor. These 
are seen as an outcome of the inability to act in the Yugoslav civil war. The later Petersberg tasks 
of 2009 has a clearer military dimension, allowing the EU to expand its operational capacities to 
include more complex and less non-aggression strategies as well as allowing the EU to 
participate in a conflict situation for a longer period of time (EEAS, 2015d). When looking at the 
operational goals of the EU, the premises of the Battlegroup initiative becomes more clear, as 
operations such as ‘joint disarmament operations’ and ‘conflict prevention’ are well suited to a 
relatively small rapid reaction force like the 1,500 — 3,000 soldiers provided by the Battlegroup 
strategy (Barcikowska, 2013). 
 
As an illustrated example of an intervention instigated by a force approximating two 
Battlegroups, is the Mali conflict from 2012. In this instance, French ground troops were 
deployed to defend government interests from an insurgency (Arieff, 2013:1). Since it has been 
demonstrated, that Member States of the EU poses military capacity to intervene in conflict 
areas, it is reasonable to assume that the EU can attain military personnel from its members with 
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agreement from the Council, following the example of France. This exemplifies how the EU 
could borrow the capabilities to become an international security actor from its Member States.  
 
The framework of the EU Battlegroups has the merit that the groups are operating autonomously 
and independently, allowing armed forces of equal structure to deploy alongside one another, 
without breaking the overall military coordination. This is carried out under the authorisation of 
the EU (Barcikowska, 2013). This type of coordination is only one battle scenario, furthermore 
the EU Battlegroups are also intended to be used in combination with large military contingents 
if needed. Thus, allowing the EU to deploy alongside a national Member State force or a third 
party if the Council agrees to a strategy. The EU did through the Lisbon Treaty establish the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation initiative, allowing groups of Member States with strong 
military capabilities to make binding commitments to each other and establish permanent 
structures of cooperation (Biscop, 2011). It permit these Member States to operate in more 
demanding military operations within the CSDP framework, meaning that the cooperation is 
authorised by the EU Council. Consequently, the EU, through its operational capacities of 
Battlegroups and thus Member States, has acquired Hill’s notion of use and threat of force. 
 
4.1.4 Mutual obligation 
Lastly, to achieve military capabilities, the EU faced the challenge of mutual obligation, which is 
defined as the ability to agree (Hill, 1993). These mutual obligations have been developed as a 
response to the need for a consistent EU commitment in the Yugoslav war. It was in 1998 at 
Saint-Malo that the French and British agreed to strengthen mutual obligations as stated in the 
Saint-Malo declaration as following; “In order for the European Union to take decisions and 
approve military action [...] the Union must be given appropriate structures […]” (Saint-Malo, 
1998:1). This represents Member States of the EU pursuing increased cooperation in the area of 
foreign policy. The last treaty to attempt to incorporate this strategy to enhance the obligations of 
the Member States on objectives agreed upon by the Council is the Lisbon Treaty, which 
declares that;  
 
“Decisions referred to in paragraph 1 [[on] identify[ing] [...] strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy 
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(Consolidated version of the TEU, art.26.1, 2012, C 326:31)] shall commit the Member States in 
the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.” (Ibid.). 
 
Essentially, this signifies that a decision made in the Council, which have been agreed upon by 
an unanimous decision making process by the Member States, are mutually binding for all actors 
involved. The binding of the Member States is an important policy instrument for ensuring 
consistency between the different actors when a security strategy or a strategic objective is 
committed by the Council. This will be further elaborated in the following section of the analysis 
of capabilities in regard to policy-making. A further strengthening of mutual obligations can be 
seen in the changes of the Lisbon Treaty, where the EU acquired foreign policy legal personality 
and a High Representative of the EU of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (GSC, 2009). The 
aspect of a legal personality is important because it further gives the EU permission to legally 
bind its Member States to foreign policy decisions, made either by unanimous decision making 
or qualified majority voting. Essentially, this will further a foreign policy consistency, as it 
allows states to directly negotiate treaties and agreements with the EEAS and the High 
Representative, instead of as before at worst negotiating a foreign policy agreement with each 
Member State individually. 
 
As a concluding remark, this analytical perspective demonstrates that the European Union indeed 
can be observed to possess military capabilities. By resorting to Bretherton and Vogler’s 
dimension of policy instruments, while examining Hill’s statement of military capabilities, it is 
in the investigated aspects recognised that the EU has confronted the challenges of resources, 
operational capacities and mutual obligation. These challenges have been surmounted by the 
resources in the budget of the CFSP; the operational capacities of the EU Member States and the 
newly constructed EU Battlegroups; and the TEU that contributed with Article 26 §1 to bind all 
involved Member States. Combined, these components give the indication of a significant 
extended military capability as an EU policy instruments. 
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4.2 Constructed capabilities 
4.2.1 Policy making 
The EU’s External Action Service — established by the Lisbon Treaty — has expressed that the 
EU is a leading international actor aiming to influence world policies (EEAS, 2015a). Another 
indication is made by Javier Solana — former High Representative for CFSP  — when he stated 
in a speech, that the EU should play an enhanced role in international affairs (Solana, 2005:3). In 
terms of the availability of policy instruments, this has shown to be valid to an extent, however 
Bretherton and Vogler describe capabilities as more than material conditions.   
 
In 1999 the CFSP was equipped with the European Security and Defence Policy, which currently 
is known as ‘Common Security and Defense Policy’ (CSDP). The CSDP works as an essential 
part of the CFSP, which shall “[...] provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on 
civil and military assets” (Consolidated version of TEU, art. 42, 2012, C 326:38). The EU shall 
utilise these assets during missions of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security (Ibid.). The CSDP is thus accounted to be the operational aspect of the 
CFSP. Again, the Council is responsible for formulating strategic objectives for the CFSP (Mix, 
2013). 
 
According to Bretherton and Vogler, capabilities also indicate the internal affairs of the EU’s 
actions or inactions. Given this, the formulation of effective policies becomes crucial (Bretherton 
& Vogler, 2006). This dimension of capabilities, which is referred to as ‘policy-making’ in the 
thesis, takes place in the CSDP area. CSDP was established in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 
is concerned with matters of diplomacy and works with security and defence. In terms of security 
policy-making the CSDP is dependent on the EU Council, as a key decision-making body. The 
Council represents a single representative from each Member State, meaning 28 EU Heads of 
State and Government (Mix, 2013:10). These representatives are first and foremost responsible 
of formulating the CFSP policies, and secondly – as expressed through the Treaty of the 
European Union, they are also responsible for “[…] identify the Union’s strategic interests and 
determine the objectives of its common foreign and security policy” (Consolidated version of 
TEU, art. 22.1, 2012, C 326:29), including the CSDP. These responsibilities must be carried out 
by means of articulating a stronger collective political purpose to strengthen its capabilities. In 
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line with Solana stating that a stronger European presence on the international stage is desired 
(Solana, 2005:1) highlights how cohesiveness and consistency both, elements of capabilities, are 
necessities to a stronger international presence (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Moreover, to state 
that a stronger presence is sought-after means that capabilities of that period of time were 
incomplete, or at least that it met difficulties. Capabilities, can therefore hinder response to 
opportunities and thereby presence. Thus, if capabilities, which has an impact on bringing forth 
presence, hinders processes of policy-making, it makes it unachievable to carry out the 
instruments available in Common Security and Defense Policy.  
 
4.2.2 Coherence 
In the former pillar structure of the EU, the CFSP was accounted as a fully intergovernmental 
nature. This meant that the CFSP was subject to unanimous voting on decisions of the EU 
foreign policy, allowing the Council, through the Member States, full veto power and control on 
EU policy actions (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). This meant that any military operations planned 
under the colours of the European army, would have to be decided by the Council unanimously 
or with less than one third abstentions weighted on population of Member States. As the Member 
States diverged both on national interests and international ambitions, consensus voting does not 
allow the EU an extensive foreign policy. This structural deficiency however has one large 
exception, where Member State willingness and ambitions has converged; the enlargement 
policy (Rehn, 2008). The enlargement policy is admitting new Member States into the EU, and is 
most prominent for having integrated large parts of the former USSR. This stands as a testimony 
to what a coherent foreign policy can achieve, even through unanimity voting. The EU has tried 
to expand their foreign policy scope with first the Maastricht Treaty (Ginsberg, 1999), seeking to 
enhance cross-pillar cooperation and with the Lisbon Treaty abolishing the pillar structure. 
Nevertheless, referendums held in the Member States blocked the notion of demoting unanimity 
voting on the Council in regard to military policy, to qualified majority voting. This has 
effectively allowed the Member States to retain full control of their military capacities, but also 
allowed for a huge incoherency problem between the EEAS, the Council and the Member States. 
In other policy areas the Lisbon Treaty has been successful in increasing the EU’s coherency, by 
appointing a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and granting this 
representative an operational institution, which is only partly subject to the Commission and the 
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Council (Dassù & Monetti, 2010:41). This has increased the overall coherency of the EU 
external representation (Ibid.), but has by contrast also made the Council problems on the use of 
military force more apparent, decreasing coherency in this policy area. Even though, the EU’s 
presence has been considered incoherent (Ginsberg, 1999:20), these alterations, can be seen as 
indications of decreasing incoherency by attempting to further coordination. As an outcome of 
the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission and the Council were accorded joint responsibility of the 
CFSP's funding (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). This cooperational initiative can be perceived as 
ways in which the CFSP has been utilising economic policy instruments, despite the differences 
of these institutions. This also highlights a tendency toward a power-struggle between the 
Council and the Commission. However, it currently still underlines the incoherency problem 
between the Member States, the Council and the Commission, and thus the Lisbon Treaty has 
failed to solve the problem underlying the CFSP in regard to military policy. This means that the 
EU has been unsuccessful in the formulation of a coherent CSDP, ultimately because of the lack 
of commitment from the Member States to a supranational foreign policy. This has further meant 
that the EU's formulation of policies through the CSDP, has increased Member State incentive to 
work outside the CSDP framework as seen in the division created by the American call for 
volunteers for their war in Iraq (Scharrer, 2003). Moreover, the coherency problem which the EU 
faces, can as seen in the Iraq war, have a spillover effect on the coordination and consistency 
between EU institutional policies, further damaging the whole CFSP. In this perspective, 
specifically the CSDP and more broadly the CFSP is damaged by the divergence in the Member 
State national interests and foreign policy ambitions.  
 
4.2.3 Consistency 
Despite the aim of decreasing incoherence by removing the three-pillar structure, the cross-pillar 
structure meets problems of its own. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 introduced the ‘Common 
Strategies’ — another responsibility of the Council — which was a cross-pillar initiative that 
aimed to collect every policy instrument and to make them available for the EU. As stated 
earlier, the CFSP has a budget where it can exploit military assets from the CDSP (Smith, 2005). 
The policy instruments have therefore been made available, however it does interact with the 
second problem of policy-making; which is consistency. According to Bretherton and Vogler, 
this problem refers to uniformity between EU’s- and the Member State’s external policies. As 
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CFSP is a policy area that includes military and civilian assets from CSDP, its aim is to act 
consistently and to speak with one voice, aiming to create more coherence. Nevertheless this area 
is referred to as high politics. In addition, it can be argued that foreign policy is important for 
Member States, because of the principle of state sovereignty. This principle entails that all states 
are equal and borders are sacred (Ypi, 2008). However, as holding a membership in the EU, 
these principles are to some extent interfered with. Firstly, the ‘all states are equal’, can be 
argued to be contradictory in terms of voting procedures, where larger states have more votes 
than the smaller states, as it is a matter of representing a population size. The second is seen in 
relation to the ‘free movement’ of the EU, which was implemented in 1987, entailing to move 
goods, services, capacities and labour between and across the Member State borders (Cini & 
Borragán, 2003). Thus, sovereignty can be identified as a key aspect of the EU foreign policy, 
and when attempting to unfold common policies in areas of foreign policy, the Member State can 
perceive itself to relinquish even more of their state sovereignty to the EU. However, it can be 
stated that the TEU article 4 have taken this into account by advocating that “It shall respect 
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security 
remains the sole responsibility of each member state” (Consolidated version of TEU, 2012, art. 
4.2:18). Nevertheless, this may appear controversial as it is still the Council’s responsibility to 
formulate common foreign policies to act upon (Mix, 2013), in order to promote security and 
enable the EU as an internationally present security actor. 
 
This question of sovereignty has been scrutinised in regard to a cost-benefit calculation by 
Phillip Gordon in Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy. This advocates, that states will share 
their sovereignty, and even surrender their sovereignty, if the perceived gains of common action 
outweigh the costs of lost sovereignty (Gordon, 1997:80). If  perceived that the costs of CSDP 
are greater than the benefits, it is arguable to assume that Member States would undermine EU 
policies, as to preserve their own national interests. Moreover, this can be reflected in the 
decision-making procedure, wherein the bigger Member States prefer an intergovernmental 
structure (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). This can be argued in relation to Gordon’s statement that 
they perceive the costs to be greater than the gains and therefore retrain their formal power. As 
opposed to this, smaller Member States prefer a Community method, which is understood as they 
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see advantages to a greater extent in terms of common policies and joint action. This means, that 
they can share their state sovereignty for the greater gain, whereas the bigger Member States 
have a different perception. According to Gordon, it must not be feared by the Member States 
that common policy will diverge significantly from their national policy. Instead it will be a 
worthy sacrifice of sovereignty (Gordon, 1997). Additionally, not all Member States as 
individual nation-states conduct a similar approach to foreign policy, and here divergent national 
interests are found. It could be argued in this context that the Member States do not share a 
common vision of the world that could guide a CSDP (Schmitt, 2003). This was especially 
evident during the Iraq war in 2003, which marked the EU’s inability to agree on participating. 
The CSDP and EU Member States demonstrated a division in terms of supporting the US plans 
for a military intervention in Iraq (Scharrer, 2003). Germany and France were found on one side 
of the dividing line, whereas UK and Spain allied on the other side (Spyer, 2007). The problem, 
according to Hans-Eckart Scharrer, was the lack of commitment, even to the principle of 
speaking with one voice, which was held undecided in the peak of the war (Scharrer, 2003). 
Another challenge of formulating a common security policy, is the neutral countries such as 
Sweden, where the CSDP would demand that Sweden took a stand. Thus, it would require a re-
orientation of their national foreign policy, which might be opposed by their national population 
(Schmitt, 2003). 
 
Indeed, the reason for the importance of having a common vision of how to formulate and 
conduct policies, rely on the principle of unanimity, within CSDP, meaning that the 27 Member 
States are expected to reach consensus. This decision-making is often problematic as it includes 
a ‘veto culture’, therefore unanimity could “[...] easily block decisions and render the agreement 
ineffective” (Wolfgang, 2011:581). This veto-culture could heavily impact the CSDP, and 
potentially stop any CSDP actions. An alternative to this problem of unanimity voting would be 
an enforcement of a Qualified Majority Voting, which according to Wolfgang, accounts for 
delegating and pooling sovereignty (Wolfgang, 2011). This might enable the Member States to 
reach a more ‘speedy decision-making’, rather than being faced with the inability to act, which 
was the case during the Yugoslav civil wars in 1992; “In the Balkan [...] we were divided and 
hence incapable of stopping the bloodshed” (Solana, 2005:1). This example of inability has 
illustrated how the EU’s members were reluctant to agree on the support of a military 
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intervention, which portrayed the EU both as incoherent and inconsistent (Portela, 2009). This 
civil war indicated to what extent the EU could claim to have a common approach to foreign 
policy, with its members diverse and with opposed interests (Schmitt, 2003).  
 
However, the Qualified Majority Voting was in fact attempted in the 2004 Constitutional Treaty 
Draft, but down voted by a referendum in France and the Netherlands. This means that principles 
of unanimity in regard to CSDP intergovernmental decision-making prevailed, even under the 
provisions of Lisbon. It is noteworthy to argue that unanimity voting in itself, is not a problem 
however when Member States cannot agree, it becomes a problem. Thus, the intergovernmental 
method that governs the CSDP is the best guarantee of national interests — hereby sovereignty 
as well — which persists, even at the price of international irrelevance. This is seen in relation to 
the Commission that has been distanced from any decision-making processes as well (Bretherton 
& Vogler, 2006). In this regard, some would argue that the CSDP has been and is a failure, as its 
disunity is preventing the EU from international actorness, and is therefore not a common policy 
(Schmitt, 2003t). 
 
Thus, the arguments made so far in this analytical section, are all features of incoherency and 
inconsistency, which reflects how it is difficult to reach consensus. This section also contradicts 
Solana’s speech, wherein he stated that the EU is putting out a united message (Solana, 2005). 
However as argued, the internal context is deviating from a unified message, which disables the 
EU in managing security affairs beyond the EU’s borders. Thus, Solana recognised that it would 
require hard work to realise. This is assumed to be deriving from the incoherence and 
inconsistency of policies and actions, which are not collectively conducted.  
 
As a concluding remark, it can be argued that the security policy of the EU is strongly 
intergovernmental, as a means to sustain state sovereignty. Furthermore, with the principle of 
unanimity, in line with the down-voted Constitutional Treaty Draft, an unwillingness to authorise 
majority voting is one of the obstacles to consistent policies (Ypi, 2008). The main reason that 
the EU is incapable of being a unified security actor, is thus based on its limited capability 
actorness, which  is embedded in the problems of consistency of divergent interests. The 
experiences of EU’s involvement in conflict situations as Yugoslavia, have shown that “[...] 
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when the Union presents itself in a piecemeal fashion, its influence is limited” (Prodi, 2001:9). 
And since the EU security policy decision making process has not changed , which is why 
unanimity is still a problem, as it limits the scope the EU can operate within. It is therefore 
argued that the EU finds it difficult to agree in consensus, which affects its use of policy 
instruments available, hereby affecting its presence and its ability to respond more thoroughly to 
opportunity. The EU is challenged as it lacks a supranational authority which makes foreign 
policy decisions, and must depend on the principles of unanimity (Dassù & Monetti, 2010, 2010) 
(EEAS, 2013b). The EU has been unsuccessful in fulfilling the criteria by Bretherton and 
Vogler, which hinders its international role.   
 
4.3 A stronger European presence  
According to Hill, it is possible for the EU to operate internationally with means of security 
(Hill, 1993). Despite this possibility, some prerequisites has been stated in terms of being an 
international actor, one of which was to be delimited from others. Based on a sub conclusion 
from the policy-making section, this has been shown to be problematic, because of the 
intergovernmental structure of the Council. According to Hill, expectations are external and 
internal ambitions of problem solving capabilities cast upon the EU, which can be said to be 
evidently supported by Solana’s speech whom explicitly addresses “Both our citizens and our 
international partners want and expect a stronger European presence on the international 
stage” (Solana, 2005:1). This is problematic as the EU’s military dimension lies solely with the 
Member States, and by unanimity voting structure, it becomes less likely to be fast moving as it 
depends on the political willingness from the members. To an extent, the Members States are 
therefore limiting the international scope of the EU, as internal expectations must be ambitions 
deriving from the EU members. Following Hill, this is discouraging for a full actorness in line 
with problems of coherency (Hill, 1993:318). However, this can also, to an extent, be seen as a 
paradox in the sense that the EU Member State do wish to make the EU more effective and 
consistent as an international actor. However this requires abstaining from state sovereignty in 
return for the benefits of joint action, also it is required as an international actor to be 
autonomous. All of which makes it difficult to enable the ability to agree on decisions and hold 
them (Ibid.:318). If the EU cannot agree on using its capabilities, which has been analysed in in 
reference to the conceptualisation of capabilities by Bretherton and Vogler, the EU cannot be an 
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international intervener. This is why, it can to an extent be argued that, CFSP does not live up to 
be capable of taking clear decisions on high politics matters, and command the resources and 
instruments to back them up (Ibid:316). Indeed, this becomes complicated, as capabilities should 
help the EU to approximate a high profile and coherent identity in foreign policy, however the 
element is performing preventive because of divergent interests. 
  
This responds to Hill’s argument that what is expected from the EU and what the EU can agree 
on to do military, are two very different things. Whilst, he stated that the demands that the EU 
were facing during the outbreak of the Yugoslavia war were not realistic (Hill, 1993). The 
question of why the world repeatedly – in spite of 25 years of disappointment – expect the EU to 
become an international actor. And also, why the EU Member States have unrealistic 
expectations to the EU’s actorness in regard to how much sovereignty the Member States are 
willing to share to the EU foreign policy project can be argued to be embedded in the external 
environment. This means that the EU is as any other actor influenced by outside shifting 
demands and of international politics to perform as an international actor, whether the EU is 
ready or capable (Ginsberg, 1999:435). Additionally, the following quote indicates how this is 
apparent; “Kissinger: […] challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and the drift of the center 
of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific […] “From a European 
perspective, these […] shifts are just too big to be left to the United States alone” (Dassú & 
Menotti, 2010:216-217). This essential diversification of problems and that the international 
order is suggesting multipolarity in a world where unipolarity is decreasing (Posen, 2011), the 
international stage calls for more international actors. Hence, it shows the relevance of the 
expectations put upon the EU foreign and security framework to enable the EU to engage in 
affairs beyond its borders.   
  
Significantly affected by expectations of operating as a unitary international actor in terms of 
foreign and security policy, the EU is experiencing an interplay between capabilities and 
expectations that is rather unbalanced. The extent to which the EU can perform alone with its 
capabilities and what is substantive expected from the EU is inadequate. As it has been 
recognised that the EU holds a comprehensive approach to complex issues such as external 
security affairs, it is plausible to explore an EU-UN cooperation as a way in which the EU can 
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operate differently. Pursuing Hill’s utilisation of Sjöstedt’s definition of an international actor, 
the EU must possess certain prerequisites for action on the international stage (Hill, 1993:309). 
Further stated, this is perceived in line with a legal personality that can enable capabilities to 
conduct negotiations with third parties (Ibid.). The structural preconditions of the legal 
personality was made accessible under provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, as a means to bilateral 
and multilateral agreements with third parties such as international organisations (Lisbon Treaty, 
2007). The investigation of the EU’s relation to UN thus becomes relevant to explore. 
 
5.0 Analysis II 
This following part of the analysis takes account of the second proposition, which scrutinises 
the EU’s capabilities under the auspices of the UN and whether the EU approximate a security 
role. Thomas Renard, with his concept of strategic partnerships is included in contributing to 
the study of the EU-UN relation. It must be noted, that the analysis still is based on the 
Bretherton and Vogler’s three-dimensional model, in which capabilities, as stated in the 
proposition, is the focal point of analysis. This means that the key indicators of capabilities - 
policy instruments and policy-making - are presented as the focus. 
 
5.1 The advantages of international cooperation  
The current international environment is experiencing a power shift from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific (Renard, 2011). Furthermore, an increase in complexity is caused by going from an 
international structure of unipolarity to multipolarity (Rosen, 2011). According to Renard, this 
encourages actors to cope with the changing structure by either competing or cooperating with 
other actors (Renard, 2011). Based on this, strategic partnerships are necessary to manage in 
accordance to this changing nature of the world (Renard & Hooijmaaijers, 2011). At the prospect 
of this, the EU recognises the UN as a legitimate actor (Renard, 2012). According to Renard, this 
is expected to pave the way for important cooperation (Ibid.). Therefore it is valid to evaluate a 
cooperation- or competition relation between the EU and the UN, based on the perceptions that 
they hold of each other. It is found exceedingly evident, that the EU acknowledges its relation 
with the UN to be cooperative. The following was stated by the EEAS, which is seen as an 
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affirmation; “The UN is a key EU partner and an indispensable global forum for tackling global 
challenges” (EEAS, 2015e). EEAS identifies the exact challenge of a global power shift, which 
Renard foresees as a danger that can mature into competition, compelling the EU into a less 
applicable role in international affairs. 
 
More recently, at the UN headquarters in New York, a press conference in 2015 found place 
where the High Representative and Vice President Federica Mogherini - on behalf of the 
event of migration deaths in the Mediterranean – stated directly to the UN “I found a very 
high level of understanding and sharing of our concerns, our sense of urgency, of the need to 
act and to act quick and together in full cooperation, in full partnership” (EEAS, 2015f). This 
implies that the EU does not merely see its relation with the UN as cooperation, but also as a 
partnership. The necessity of this partnership is embedded in the Lisbon Treaty; “The Union 
shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, […], including respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter.” (Consolidated version on the TEU, art. 3.5, 2012, C 326:17). 
  
The UN is the only global international organisation (Kaushik & Aggarwal, 2005), entailing 
different institutional bodies that each have their own responsibilities and policy areas 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). The EU collaborates specifically with one of the institutional 
bodies, which is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP’s working 
objectives are among others, to reduce the risk of armed conflicts, and provide recovery to 
conflict reconstruction (UNDP, 2009). What is highlighted here, is that the EU-UN is more 
than a partnership, it is what the EU have titled themselves; a strategic partnership. This was 
transparently marked by a Memorandum of Understanding, which was called the Strategic 
Partnership Agreement, signed in 2004. This agreement indicates; “shared goals of 
establishing the solid foundations for peace and recovery from crisis” (Ibid.). 
A report on the EU-UN relationship was published a decade later, describing the UNDP-EU 
Partnership; 10 years of UNDP-EU Strategic Partnership (UNDP, 2014). Following Renard, 
the ways in which the EU perceive the importance of a partnership, must be equal to how 
these partners recognise the EU. The role of the EU in international affairs must be interpreted 
as equally influential. This could be achieved by mutual recognition, which is explicitly 
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evident, in the statement of the UNDP Administrator, Helen Clark, in the abovementioned 
report; “In the past decade the EU has been a major supporter of the UNDP’s work” (Ibid.). 
Additionally, a year before the 10th anniversary of the strategic partnership, the UN Secretary-
General, Ban Ki-Moon, stated as a general perception the following in the report: “The EU 
has been a long-standing supporter of the UN efforts towards reaching the MDGs. This report 
represents some of the results of our fruitful collaboration in 2013 […] together, we save 
millions of lives when crises erupted” (UN Brussels, 2014). Furthermore, despite the mutual 
recognition, which is important, what becomes significant to determine a strategic partnership 
is also the principle of shared strategic objectives. This makes the approach to the partnership 
both more meaningful and coherent. In the following subsection the objectives between the 
EU and the UN are analysed. 
 
5.2 The strategy in Strategic Partnership  
The cooperation found in the strategic partnership between the EU and the UN are based on 
concrete issues, which is evident in the area of security. These concrete issues are being 
tackled by sharing common concerns, which has fostered an understanding of how to 
approach the issues. It is stated in the Lisbon Treaty that the EU should shape partnerships 
with international organisations, with the aim “[…] to promote multilateral solutions to 
common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations” (Consolidated 
version on the TEU, art. 21.1, C 326:28). In the 10 years UNDP-EU Strategic Partnership 
report, it is expressed how the partnership is highly prudent as they share the same values and 
objectives (UNDP, 2014). The goals presented in the report aims to promote peace, conflict 
prevention and human rights, in which crisis related situations become crucial as means to an 
end (Ibid.). As these goals are shared collectively between the two organisations, security 
problems generate incentives for the partners to cooperate in order to manage concerns of 
high politics.  
It can be detected from the Amsterdam Treaty how common strategies should be given more 
importance. It was stated that in order for the EU to address its own interests it shall decide on 
common strategies, as they “[...] shall set out their objectives, [...] and means to be made 
available by the Union [...]” (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, art. J.3.2, C 326:8) - This is 
43 
evident in the EU-UN Strategic Partnership Agreement. In this matter, common strategies 
were also mentioned in ESS with reference to “Common threat assessments are the best basis 
for common actions. This requires improved sharing […] with partners” (ESS, 2003:12). In 
respect to the statement, it is implied that a partnership is required in order to accommodate 
common concerns.  
To shortly illustrate how the partnership between the EU and the UN takes place in practice, 
the ESS launched by the Council, outlines how the EU should provide assistance in conflict 
areas in the support of “[…] enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis-
management situations” (ESS, 2003:11). This implies that the EU and the UN are working 
together in the area of crisis management as a means to maintain international security and 
peace. The UNDP-EU strategic partnership is a forum between the two partners, in which the 
management of security issues are being formulated. As for crisis management missions, 
including peacekeeping operations, the Lisbon Treaty clarifies how the operational arm of the 
Council, the CSDP, shall carry out missions with civilian and military assets under the 
framework of the Petersberg Task, with respect to the United Nations Charter (Lisbon Treaty, 
art. 2.5, 2007, C 306:11). This is a reflection of how the EU perceives the UN to be closely 
linked to its own understanding of tackling security problems. 
Explicitly the Strategic Partnership Agreement that was launched in 2004 summarises specific 
guidelines and goals for; humanitarian cooperation, post-conflict reconstruction, and conflict 
prevention, with the aim of assessing joint missions (UNDP, 2004). The Agreement outlines 
what imperative the partnership shares, as it is stated that the EU and UNDP, “decide to work 
together towards shared goal” (UNDP, 2004:3). This is formulated in terms of developing 
and structuring cooperation in areas of common concerns as well (Ibid.). Not only does this 
imply that the EU and the UN are both influential in pursuing the shared goals, however a 
strategic partnership according to Renard should be a way, in which the EU can pursue its 
interests as well. The Agreement specifies ‘mutual benefits’, that interprets the underlying 
interests both actors represent individually. In order for the partners to meet these shared 
goals, the EU and the UN have facilitated a range of objectives. The partnership is based upon 
close collaboration on common policy approaches, in which they facilitate “[…] joint 
identification of programmes, […] enhance knowledge sharing with a view to fostering 
improved co-ordination, […] to advance development effectiveness of the actions of both 
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institutions” (UNDP, 2004:4). This is to be achieved through a policy dialogue between the 
EU and the UN, occurring on a regular basis, where operations should be practised in 
accordance to “[…] common interest and adequate capacities” (UNDP, 2004:4). 
  
The UNDP-EU strategic partnership, illustrates the EU and the UN’s have a common crisis 
management direction, as they share common strategic objectives. As outlined, it is of great 
importance that the EU and the UN have a common understanding of approaching security 
affairs. It creates meaning in the strategic partnership, and hereby the reasoning of the EU’s 
involvement in the international organisation. Thus, this contributes to the strategic part of the 
partnership, as they can effectively approach each other in collaboration as to managing crisis 
situation based on common and shared understanding. In addition the EU and the UN are 
using each other effectively as foreign policy instruments as a strategic partnership should - 
according to Renard this is what builds a true strategic partnership. The reasoning behind the 
strategic partnership is defined - by EU Commissioner for Development, Andris Piebalgs - as 
a force for promoting peace through conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction as its 
main pillar in relation to cross-cutting issues of human rights (European Commission, 2012a). 
This gives a clear direction of how the strategic partnership is strategically outlined. 
  
The ESS has been criticised by Renard, for saying more about how to do things than about 
what exactly to do strategically (Renard, 2011: IV). In the Joint Declaration on UN-EU 
cooperation in Crisis Management, it has been clarified what must be done to reach the goals 
of the partnership in this specific area. This is described as following; partners should act 
upon ‘mutual co-ordination’ in areas of planning, training, and communication (Joint 
Declaration, 2003). This entails that the EU and the UN through an establishment of ‘a joint 
consultative mechanism’, improve their coordination and create more coherence as well. In 
order for the EU to meet these objectives it is required to be able to assess missions, 
establishing joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian 
personnel (Joint Declaration, 2003). Despite Renard’s criticism of the ESS in which the EU 
was unsuccessful in addressing what to do exactly (Renard, 2011), it can to an extent be 
stated, that the EU has been able to address otherwise with the UN as its strategic partner. The 
ESS does not necessitate that the EU has not been clear on its objectives, of what explicitly 
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must be done. The ESS is thus a clear statement of intent, equal to the other partnerships of 
the EU, a declaration of how to do foreign policy without any actual substance as criticised by 
Renard. Whether the EU-UN stated partnership is the same remains to be seen. 
5.3 Policy making 
One of the most crucial advantages which the EU possesses in its strategic partnership with the 
UN, is located in the EU’s utilisation of policy instruments, as the CFSP in this area is situated 
under the EEAS. The Council only decides the general objectives and annual budget of the 
EEAS (European Commission, 2012b). The EEAS can be asserted to be relatively unbiased 
regarding national interests, as is the challenge on the Council. This signifies that the EEAS can 
choose to provide humanitarian aid to third world countries or conflict situated countries, without 
the need for a Council vote (EEAS, 2015g). Essentially, this reduces the challenges the EU has 
faced concerning Member State interests limiting the scope of the EU’s international actorness. 
Thereby allowing the EU to further consistent strategy making, and also limit incoherency by 
effectively allowing the EU to negotiate treaties or execute foreign policy actions with one voice. 
This legal personality allows the EU to have a more efficient CFSP, although only in cases that 
avoid the use of military force, as this competency is still completely located with the Member 
States (TFEU, art.222.1, 2012, C 326:148). 
As a consequence, the strategic partnership between the EU and the UN is still limited in 
connection to military force. The Council is still required to make a unanimous vote when 
utilising military force, under the CSDP, even when lending military support to the UN as 
described by the Petersberg Tasks, since the military support is from the Member States. This is 
reported in the Treaty, as the Member States are still solely responsible for their use of military 
capabilities, and as the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) establishes, any Member State can 
block the use of other Member States' use of military personnel through the EU (TEU, 2012). 
This configuration makes it much easier for military Member States to act around the EU, 
making Member States lend their military capacities to the UN without a vote on the EU 
Council. Consequently, allowing the EU inefficiency and incoherency in military matters 
(EEAS, 2015h). 
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As Bretherton and Vogler describe, policy making is; the ability to effectively formulate policies, 
and consistently stick to these (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). The Lisbon Treaty has given the 
EEAS the sole executive policy authority of the CFSP, enabling the institution to make and 
effect EU foreign policy. Moreover, this institutional supranational decision making, along with 
the legal personality, also given by this setup, has increased the EU foreign policy coherence 
(TEU, 2012). An increase in coherence has further strengthened the EU’s capabilities as a policy 
maker, securing the EU more foreign policy capabilities. The EEAS additionally allows the EU 
to consistently plan strategies without accountancy to the Member States as to national interests 
and voting assemblies. This is further made effective by the head of the EEAS, Federica 
Mogherini, being the Vice-president of the European Commission, effectively allowing her a say 
in the internal EU implementation of the CFSP (EEAS, 2015i). As an institution supporting the 
High Representative, the EEAS is allowed to nearly be the sole instigator of the EU foreign 
policy further allowing the EU more coherence and consistency in its foreign policy. The EEAS 
has such diverse responsibilities as: the implementation of the general foreign policy guidelines 
given by the Council, overseeing the implementation of foreign policy in the Member States, to 
the actual diplomatic and humanitarian aid outside of the EU borders (EEAS, 2015h). These 
responsibilities are designated to the EEAS across the former pillar structure, as the EEAS is 
responsible for the economic, and most of the human resources, the EU has at its foreign policy 
disposal - the last excluding military personnel and equipment. This has allowed the EU to move 
beyond its former unanimity and qualified majority voting problems, by frequently not involving 
the Council. And moreover allowing the EU foreign policy more independence but also more 
coherence both in planning and application of foreign policy (Solana, 2005). This means that the 
EU does have, through the Lisbon Treaty, effective policy making when it is not utilising 
military capacities.  
 
5.4 Policy instruments 
In relation to the above problems concerning the complication of agreeing on military aspects, 
the EU still contributes to the strategic partnership with the UN using military capabilities. As 
stated by Renard, the Union - in this respect the EU’s Member Countries - contributed to 
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operations within the UN with 6.660 personnel in 20104 (Renard, 2011:26). This can also be 
observed in the report ‘Plan of Action to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping’ where 
the EEAS “define a list of civilian capabilities the EU Member States can potentially put at UN 
disposal” (EEAS, 2012:9). It creates a coherence between the partners, where clear clarifications 
are made (Renard, 2011), since the cooperation between the EU and the UN entails the EU 
Member States; bridging, co-deploying and taking-over their military deployments; ahead, 
parallel with and after UN operations, thereby sharing mutual resources and objectives (EEAS, 
2012:16). For that reason it is beneficial to the partnership and cooperation between the EU and 
UN. However, it needs to be recognised that it is the EU’s Member States’ personnel 
contributions, that are used and not the EU’s own personnel, as the EU has no standing army 
(EEAS, 2015a). This thesis does not view the personnel contributions as the EU’s own 
capabilities, since capabilities in this respect is perceived as those of a unified actor. However, 
the thesis also needs to acknowledge that one cannot always completely separate the EU and the 
Member States military capacities in the case of the UN. This is due to the EEAS, who in some 
cases can have a mediating role, where it can request military capabilities from willing Member 
States, for UN operations, which is based on a political willingness. 
 
Changing the focus to other policy instruments, such as economic tools, the EU is a major 
contributor to the UN in terms of their regular budget, covering cost for; political affairs; 
international justice and law; international cooperation for development; public information; 
human rights; and humanitarian affairs. The EU has for instance contributed with 38.9% of the 
UN’s regular budget in 2007 (UNRIC, 2007). This stands in sharp contrast to the other large 
contributors, such as the US and Japan, to the UN, who in 2007 donated respectively 22.5% and 
22% of the overall budget (UNRIC, 2007). Entailing that the EU is the largest funder of the 
UN’s general budget — a statement that is supported by the UN who declares that the EU is; 
“[…]by far the largest donor” (UNRIC, 2007:7). 
The financial funding is, according to Bretherton and Vogler, seen as a policy instrument 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006) and is in the case of the EU reflected in the area of peacekeeping 
operations taking place in the scope of the UN. In this respect, it is the EU Commision and the 
EEAS that contribute the funds, of a collective EU (EEAS, 2015h), to the UN Department of 
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Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) — a UN organ that provides political and executive direction 
to the UN peacekeeping operations (UN Peacekeeping, 2015a). Peacekeeping operations is a 
method of cooperation between the EU and the UN. In general, the notion of peacekeeping 
operations has become the legal framework for the peaceful settlement of disputes (United 
Nations, 1992). It facilities protecting civilians, assisting disarmament, reintegrating former 
combatant and in general restore the rule of law (UN Peacekeeping, 2015a). Additionally, the 
ESS suggests that “[...]none of the new threats are purely military” (ESS, 2003:7), and requires a 
mixture of instruments - illustrating that military means are insufficient when dealing with 
present security issues. Therefore it is possible for the EU to make use of other policy 
instruments and still combat threats to peace, through its contribution of economic means to the 
UN. It can be argued that economic instruments are military means in regard of security matters 
(Smith, 2005), as political and economic means are a part of the “military means [...] for dealing 
with international problems” (Ibid:9). The EU can therefore utilise financial means as a military 
tool for peacekeeping operations, since peacekeeping does not exclude the use of force (Ibid:2).  
The financial support that the EU has contributed to the DPKO in the area of peacekeeping has 
only grown. This is evident from 2006 to 2010 where the contributions increased from 38.6% 
(UNRIC, 2007:8) to 40.7%5 (Renard, 2011:26). This signifies yet again that the collective EU is 
a major actor in regard to the economic contributions and that the EU’s presence concerning the 
funding of the DPKO, and thus the UN, is only increasing. Furthermore, when the EU funding is 
shown in relation to the other contributions, on 26.1%, 17.7% and 16.6%, it has been proven that 
the EU is the largest funder in this concern (UNRIC, 2007). 
Additionally, the problem concerning the EU’s policy instruments, was that they could not be 
utilised due to the lack of coherence and consistency in the decision making process. However, 
as argued, the decision making process does not cover economic instruments, meaning that it 
becomes relatively uncomplicated for the EU to financially contribute to security affairs. 
Examples of the financial support provided by the EEAS to the DPKO in 2012-2013 can be 
found in the operations in Somalia, the Central African Republic and Mali - with approximate 
EU contributions of €600 million, €100 million and €50 million (Tardy, 2013:3). Thus 
displaying that the EU has not only made the financial support available for the UN, but that this 
support is also used during  UN peacekeeping operations.  
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As a response to the recent significant and increasing fundings from the EU, both in terms of the 
regular UN budget and the UN peacekeeping operations, the UN acknowledges that the EU 
supports the maintaining of international peace and security in relation to the UN (UN 
Peacekeeping, 2015a). Thereby recognising the EU as a valuable asset, which Renard (2011) 
also stresses is an essential part of a strategic partnership. However, the EU has in the ESS stated 
equal importance of the UN, wherein the strengthening of the UN and “equipping it to fulfill its 
responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority” (ESS, 2003:9). This illustrates that 
the financial support is one way of equipping the UN with prospects to a maintenance of 
international peace (Ibid.).  
Financial funding is consequently perceived as a crucial foreign policy instrument, which the EU 
applies, since the economic instrument is being used to achieve an important and relevant 
cooperation with the UN through the strategic partnership programme. This can also be deduced 
from the funding of peacekeeping operations, which is a clear indicator of a substantial strategic 
relationship between the EU and the UN. By receiving contributions from the EU, the UN 
obtains the capacity needed to conduct military and civilian peacekeeping operations. It can be 
stated, that the UN is able to pursue its own interest. Considering the other aspect, the EU gains, 
by contributing to the UN’s budget for peacekeeping operations, recognition not only by the UN, 
but by the entire multilateral forum (ESS, 2003). Since the contribution from the EU is such an 
huge part of the overall peacekeeping budget, it becomes a necessity that the EU continue 
funding the UN financially, since the DPKO needs the contribution it receives from the EU. The 
EU thus becomes a relevant actor in relation to the UN, since the UN becomes dependent on the 
EU to pursue UN interests. This generated a comprehensive understanding of cooperation 
between the two actors.  
 
5.5 A new security perspective 
Based on the theoretical framework of Bretherton and Vogler, capabilities have been scrutinised 
in the earlier subsections of this analysis. This means that it has been made probable that both the 
policy instruments and the policy making procedure within this context of the UN, have enabled 
the EU to make use of its full potential in terms of capabilities. However, different from the 
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analysis on the first proposition the availability of policy instruments has been examined with 
financial means instead of military means, as the EU has no army (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006).  
 
The availability of economic policy instruments and the formulation of policies in the context of 
the UN, have been shown to be dissimilar to the first proposition. This can be seen as a way of 
responding to the external changing context. With reference to the ESS, it is stated that new 
threats have created opportunities for a more comprehensive international cooperation “There 
are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats […] are common threats, 
shared with all our closest partners. […] We need to pursue our objectives both through 
multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships […]” (ESS, 
2003:13). As the external context changes, opportunities arise. As for the 21st century, the world 
has become a place of new dangers, however with new opportunities as well (ESS, 2003:14). 
Based on opportunities rise as an outcome of world events (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006) the EU 
has to an certain extent been responding to the opportunities; as addressed in the ESS wherein 
the EU should share in the responsibility for international security, by actively taking part in 
peacekeeping operations. The external environment has generated incentives for international 
cooperation, which the EU has been able to respond to, based on the policy instrument and 
policy structure that is accessible in this specific partnership. Moreover, by this strategic 
partnership it indicates the EU has embraced opportunity, meaning that the partnership was not 
given to the EU. Significantly this has been evident in the SP-10 years report, as Secretary-
General of UNSC has addressed it as following: “Collectively, we achieved far more than our 
organisations could have done alone” (UN Brussels, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, by embracing the opportunity of international cooperation by a strategic 
partnership with the UN, it becomes possible to act as an influential actor and exert influence 
externally. However, this has been shown to be probable in collaboration with an actor, such as 
the UN through their strategic partnership. The evaluation of the EU’s influence has entailed the 
EU’s contribution to the UN, which is based on an economic funding scale, thus it can be argued 
to be a part of the EU’s foreign policy. This is explicit in the EU´s foreign policy under the 
EEAS, which is in charge of distributing the economic support. Thus, this allows the EU to be 
present in UN’s peacekeeping operations, that aims to promote peace and create stability, which 
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is a goal of the EU’s security actorness as well (Keohane & Lehne, 2008). Hence, the EU takes 
part in security events on the international stage. 
 
Indeed, as the EU has been able to respond to opportunities, it has given the EU the chance to 
into new roles and responsibilities. This is evidence in the EU’s cooperation with the UN, in 
which the EU has embraced the role as an economic supporter. Hence, the EU’s security role 
simply cannot be studied as if it was given. Within the theoretical framework of Bretherton and 
Vogler, the EU’s actorness is under construction, which means that the EU’s security role is 
constructed through a process, that takes account of its capabilities and its international 
actorness. The UN has evidently been an international forum in which the EU has been able to 
proceed externally, in line with pursuing to operate as a security actor, as exemplified with 
peacekeeping operations. The very fact that the EU operates through the UN, is a way of 
constructing their security actorness; with the external environment, which is contributing to the 
framing of the EU actions (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). As the EU’s security actorness is 
noticeable through its utilisation of the economic policy instrument, which becomes related to 
security when a great amount – 40,7% - is distributed to the UN’s peacekeeping budget. In fact, 
the UN’s peacekeeping operations are provided by uniformed personnel, hereby troops, police 
and military observers (UN Peacekeeping, 2015b), however, as EU provides the UN with 
financial support, it enables the UN to actual deploy these troops in operations. The military 
dimension of peacekeeping operation is greatly debatable as with a distinction between military 
and civilian, however the UN follows a principle that states non-use of force with exception for 
self-defence and defence of the mandate (UN Peacekeeping, 2015b). Hence, the EU promotes 
security through its financial support of the UN. Since the UN approximates the EU’s own 
security policy goals, the EU can promote its own security concerns through the UN. 
The approximation of the EU’s security role on the international stage through the UN, 
counteracts with what Renard titled as global irrelevance (Renard, 2011). Since the EU 
encounters the changing structure of international affairs by its establishment of strategic 
partnership, the Union is present on the international stage, which generates the ability to pursue 
relevance. This can be exemplified by the UN’s recognition of EU’s partnership, which is also an 
indication of the EU’s relevance as an actor in UN’s own international work. 
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6.0 Conclusion I 
The first proposition has sought to explore, if the EU has the foreign policy capabilities to act as 
an international security actor. The parameters set by the theories of Bretherton, Vogler and Hill 
have addressed if the EU’s military capacities are  sufficient as security policy instruments, and 
if consistency and coherency is found as producing collective decisions. 
 
The EU has been evaluated through its military and economic resources, along with the 
structural prerequisites for binding the Member States to common agreements, to have acquired 
effective policy instruments for pursuing a security policy. The EU has the capacity for military 
actions through its Battlegroups and through acquiring military capacities of its Member States. 
Additionally, the economic capacity of the EU is sufficient for pursuing a foreign and security 
policy, as it has been shown that the EU, in comparison to the expenditures of a peacekeeping 
operation, has the economy for military actorness. Consequently, provided that the Member 
States votes unanimously in favour of a notion, the EU gains capabilities, both in terms of 
policy-making and the availability of policy instrument. This is further strengthened by the 
Lisbon Treaty in binding the EU Member States to mutual obligations. This has only been one 
part of the analytical outline. The results of the formulation, coherence and consistency of 
policies are deemed to be unsuccessful. The EU Member State’s different and opposing national 
interests create inconsistency in capabilities, resulting in the military policy lacking coherence. 
Furthermore, 27 EU Member States have veto power on the European Council, and when 
divergent interests are found it leads to inconsistency or a complete standstill policy-making. 
Thus, inconsistency is clarified by the divergence between EU political ambitions and Member 
State national interests. The clash of preferences limits the EU’s foreign policy-making in 
military matters, thereby not allowing the EU to respond to international opportunities of 
actorness, rendering the pursuit of foreign and security policy through this venue to be futile and 
thus disabling EU actorness.  
 
As the capability-expectations gap sought to find institutional changes as a way of closing the 
gap, it is argued that even with modifications of treaties, which have changed the institutional 
structure to overcome problems of coherency, makes the execution of military capabilities in 
foreign policy to be dependent on the Member States’ political willingness (Helwig, 2013). This 
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has shown to be problematic, which disables the policy-making capability element of the 
international actorness model. Furthermore, opportunities and presence becomes irrelevant 
because of the need of capabilities.  
 
7.0 Conclusion II 
The second proposition sought to scrutinise whether the EU’s capabilities in foreign policy were 
sufficient to enable the EU a security role under the auspices of the UN. This was carried out 
through the framework of Bretherton and Vogler, with application of Renard’s framework of 
Strategic Partnerships. The utilisation of the theoretical framework of strategic partnerships has 
contributed to the findings found in the cooperation between the EU and the UN. The mutual 
recognition the EU and the UN have acquired and their shared objectives and goals of crisis 
management are expressed through the Strategic Partnership Agreement.  
 
The strategic partnership has enabled capabilities in which policy-making is of supranational 
nature in this case. This is illustrated by the EEAS that provides humanitarian aid in different 
settings including conflict-situated countries. What is noteworthy is that Member State’s interests 
are not accounted for, as the EEAS acts beyond the unanimity problem, which was found in the  
Council. Thus this problem does not function as a limit to the scope of the EU’s international 
actorness. Hence, the consistent approach is much more likely to pave the way for actorness. The 
EEAS present the EU with a collective voice through its new legal personality contributing to 
strengthen this arrangement as it allows executing foreign policy with one voice, leading to more 
coherence. This is advantageous for capabilities in terms of policy-making wherein policy 
instrument become accessible. However, this is only applicable when it does not entail the use of 
military means, as military support comes from the Member States, leading back to requiring an 
unanimous vote from the Council.   
 
Moreover with a different measurement of policy-instrument, hereby financial tools it has been 
found that the EU is a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget: 40,7% - and by making 
use of other policy instruments than military means, it is possible to combat the new threats, as 
stated in the ESS, through the UN. This does not eliminate the EU from taking part in operations, 
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as the financial support is analysed as a mean that is perceived to be a military tool for 
peacekeeping operations. Hence, the policy-making and instruments have operationalised 
capabilities, thus enabling the EU to respond to opportunities, by international cooperation with 
the UN as a strategic partner, which has constructed a new role for the EU in which to 
approximate security actorness. This has paved the way for the EU to exert influence through 
peacekeeping operations, and therefore enable the EU to be present on the international stage. 
This has been shown to be evident as the EU promotes common security concerns in 
collaboration with the UN, which then is present. This means, true strategic partnership has been 
established between the EU and the UN, in which they use each other effectively as foreign 
policy instruments. Conclusively, the importance of being present and influential is to 
counterbalance global irrelevance as well, which the EU has shown to be able to. 
 
8.0 Discussion of findings 
The propositions’ concluding remarks have shown that the EU has the policy instruments, 
hereunder military capabilities and the economic capabilities to support a military foreign policy. 
Although, the EU has sought to develop these capabilities, the EU has been unsuccessful in 
constructing decision-making procedures resulting in a common foreign and security policy, 
because of a divergence in Member State interests. This has disabled the EU’s security actorness. 
The EU’s economic support through the EEAS to the UN-led peacekeeping operations through 
its strategic partnership, opens up for a discussion on the extent to which the EEAS’ decision-
making procedure – which is in contrast to the unanimous voting system within the European 
Council, enabling the EU to act through the EEAS to support peacekeeping operations. The EU’s 
economic support to the UN peacekeeping operations have enabled the EU to approximate 
security actorness on another platform.   
 
The UN-EU strategic partnership, although being a true strategic partnership, is still jeopardised 
by Member State incoherence. Even though the Lisbon Treaty has structurally bound the 
Member States to compliance with the EU. The Member States has the influence to instigate 
coherency problems by acting or speaking counter to the CFSP. This could depict the EU as a 
fragmented actor, especially if related to disruptions of the EU's legal personality. As the 
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mechanisms governing the compliance of the Member States, such as a Commission reprimand, 
are post-active (Euranet, 2014), the Member States can disrupt EU coherence. 
 
The UN’s budget for peacekeeping operations from 2014-2015 was $7,0 billion, considering the 
EU’s economic contribution of 40.7% to peacekeeping operations6 (Renard, 2011:26), it is 
estimated to $2,9 billion7 of the approved UN budget. The support from the EU has been argued 
to contribute to military purposes, such as financially making the military personnel deployable. 
The UN peacekeeping outlines specific contributions by country, however this does not includes 
non-state actors. This means that there are no findings stating that the EU’s contribution is used 
directly as military means. The $2,9 billion could easily be used in other areas of expenditures 
for conducting peacekeeping operation. 
 
The strategic partnership has shown to be beneficial for both the EU and the UN, since the two 
organisations share similar goals. However, this does not illustrate who is recognised as the main 
actor by the international system. Thus, it is questioned if and how the international system 
perceives the strategic partnership between the EU and the UN. The EU is the largest contributor 
to the UN peacekeeping operations, meaning that the UN would be limited in its capabilities 
without the contributions from the EU. However, the peacekeeping operations are performed 
under the organisational colours and flags of the UN (UPKO, 2015) and it could therefore be the 
UN who got the public acknowledgement when operations are performed.  
 
To answer the problem formulation, the research has shown that; the EU cannot operate by itself 
as an international security actor, however when acting through its strategic partnership with the 
UN, the EU can realise its foreign policy goals, approximating an international security actor 
role. 
 
 
  
                                                
6 Appendix I  
7 [1] Calculation: total UN budget $7,06 – EU contribution 40,7% (7,06/100*40,7 = 2,873) 
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9.0 Contribution 
In hindsight, the thesis’ use of Renard’s expanded theoretical framework has given a different 
narrative on how the EU can alternatively conduct security policy. Moreover, the thesis 
concludes that Hill’s capability-expectations gap still exists, which can be evidently found in 
contemporary literature on the EU’s foreign policy (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). The Lisbon 
Treaty and other innovations of the EU have in some areas lessened the gap, however the gap 
persists due to unanimity problems. What the thesis has sought to contribute to the literature is 
the notion that the EU might have gained a foothold within a new area of international actorness, 
contributing to a soft branch of security studies.  
10.0 Afterthoughts 
In retrospect the project could have emphasised an explanation of why the individual Member 
State’s national interests diverge, and how this occurrence influence both the internal and 
external EU policy-making. This could be scrutinised in regard to Europeanisation in sense of 
the Member State’s ability to adopt European features (Sedelmeier, 2011). This means that 
divergence is not necessarily caused by national interests, however on the political scope of the 
Member State.  
 
Another perspective on EU’s actorness could have been given by utilising Ian Manners and his 
notion of Normative Power Europe, where EU’s projection of its philanthropic foreign policy 
tries to shape what is ‘normal’ foreign policy conduction. In other words, according to Manners 
the EU can define what is normal and create these norms in the international system (Manners, 
2002). This could have been combined with the UN Secretariat and the DPKO’s normative 
power projection and how these three actors combine normative power and for their promotion 
of peacekeeping and international security.   
Instead of being explorative and narrative, the thesis could have sought to provide alternatives to, 
or solve the challenge of the EU’s unanimity problem. This could have described how the EU’s 
policy instruments become operational to solve the problem of the EU’s security actorness. 
These different examples of research could contribute to the field of EU international actorness 
and security policy.  
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